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offsetting pRogRams: stRuggling to find  
an equitable solution inteRnationally
by Silvia Fejka*
Carbon offsetting can have some laudable goals, including protection of the most pristine resources left on earth.1 As a category, however, carbon offsetting and markets 
are inappropriate international solutions to climate change and 
environmental degradation. The two current carbon offsetting 
mechanisms have dubious environmental value and maintain 
destructive behavior rather than addressing current emissions. 
Climate change is an example of a collective action problem, 
where benefits are diffuse, creating little incentive for indi-
vidual nations to act. This renders carbon offsetting programs 
particularly susceptible to free riders.2 Further, carbon offset 
loopholes weaken equitability in international negotiations and 
allow developed nations to perpetuate wasteful behavior nation-
ally.3 Although critics have discussed these problems for years, 
carbon offsetting programs continue in full force.4 A solution to 
the problems of inequity and the lack of collective action in the 
current scheme is to create a system of international obligations 
that also allows each country to achieve these goals within its 
own unique context.
Two prevalent types of carbon offsetting mechanisms exist: 
project-based offsets and carbon markets.5 In the former case, 
parties pay for-profit firms or nongovernmental organizations6 
that engage in carbon offsetting activities, such as reforestation 
or efficient energy.7 Individuals use these offsetting services 
at their own discretion.8 The project-based carbon offsetting 
market is expansive and one can offset virtually anything, from 
driving to eating.9 The second model is increasingly common; 
industry traders, states, or countries participate in a carbon trad-
ing market to meet reduction goals imposed through regulation. 
Examples include the international offsetting scheme under the 
Kyoto Protocol, the Clean Development Mechanism (“CDM”) 
under the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate 
Change,10 and the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the 
United States.11 Similar mechanisms exist for offsetting different 
pollutants as well.12 These mechanisms effectively create a right 
to pollute that can be bought and sold as a commodity.13
Critics of carbon offsetting point to its scientific unreli-
ability and questionable environmental value.14 Carbon markets 
alone do not reduce overall global carbon emissions, even at full 
efficiency.15 The calculation of the reduction of carbon emissions 
is based on uncertain projections and misevaluation of natural 
resources.16 The dubious environmental value of carbon offset-
ting also stems from its nature as an ex post solution that does 
not reduce consumption or the behaviors causing the harm.17 
Carbon offsetting is more susceptible to this critique than 
carbon markets, which may attempt to create systemic change, 
but markets also contribute to the polluting behavior for which 
they create a market, through the commoditization of a right 
to pollute.18 Essentially, offsetting schemes skirt the need for 
wider, structural change and an economy that does not depend 
on carbon consumption.19
On an international scale, the need to allocate responsibility 
for environmental degradation magnifies the disadvantages of 
carbon offsetting. Offsetting carbon emissions reallocates the 
burden to change behaviors between nations.20 Offsetting often 
perpetuates environmentally detrimental behavior in developed 
countries, and forces developing countries to either accommo-
date for less consumption or change behaviors on industrial and 
individual levels.21 Environmental justice arguments against 
offsetting encompass this issue and raise the fact that poor 
communities are disproportionately affected by environmental 
degradation and climate change.22 This is not to say that devel-
oping countries may disregard sustainability, but rather that all 
countries, especially those with carbon-based economies, should 
shoulder their respective burdens based upon their unique 
circumstances.
The attempts of nations to reallocate their burdens reflect 
that climate change is a classic collective action problem.23 
This means that an international forum is absolutely necessary 
because, in the climate change context, all nations benefit from 
a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions whether or not they 
assume the costs of that reduction.24 Carbon free riders are a 
problem particularly in the CDM and Reducing Emissions from 
Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries 
(“REDD”) programs.25 Although offsetting itself is technically 
not “free” riding, its “business as usual” approach demonstrates 
minimal effort in addressing the problem.26
This free riding problem explains the insufficiencies of 
current international climate change negotiations, such as the 
November 2011 Durban Conference.27 Without other incentives, 
developed countries, including the United States, may hesitate 
to act because climate change mostly affects the impoverished 
and its benefits are diffuse.28 This may be why Durban delegates 
failed to commit their countries to a binding plan.29 Even more 
importantly, Durban negotiators seemed to have expanded 
carbon trading mechanisms that could further exacerbate the 
problem of “free” riders who may choose to buy credits instead 
of changing their own carbon-emitting ways.30 The results 
of Durban show the need for a new international approach that 
creates obligations to promote internal changes in consumption 
and behavior without offset loopholes.
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Nations must recognize that while offsets can preserve 
existing ecosystems and promote sustainable energy projects 
that benefit local populations, they merely allow developed 
countries to continue polluting at their given rate and prevent the 
realization of an equitable solution to the collective action prob-
lem of climate change. Although the Kyoto Protocol allows for 
lesser burdens on developing countries,31 developed countries 
continue to find offset loopholes for their own commitments 
through CDM.32 Developed nations should contribute to these 
efforts separately from their own reduction obligations, such 
as through the recently implemented Green Climate Fund.33 
The global issue of climate change requires both a concerted 
international effort and strong national action to move away 
from carbon-based economies and effectively address climate 
change.
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